Can We Design Spontaneity? Hayek, Design, and the Normative Appeal of Spontaneous Orders

Authors

  • Nathanaël Colin-Jaeger American University of Paris, Center for Critical Democracy Studies, France

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.736

Abstract

Spontaneous orders are an essential concept in political theory and political economy. Such orders entail the impossibility of predicting outcomes in detail and hence controlling and directing social processes. Many phenomena characterizing contemporary societies can be depicted as spontaneous orders, from the housing and financial markets to the evolution of norms and trends. Yet, it is well known that not every spontaneous order is beneficial. Therefore, what form of political framework is compatible with recognizing such orders? In this article, I address this problem through the example of the work of Friedrich Hayek, a prominent liberal theorist of spontaneous orders. His work shows the necessity to theorize a government of spontaneous orders based on maximizing reasonable expectations and individual freedom. I finally emphasize what such a theory implies for political power, which is not abolished but should handle complexity appropriately.

Author Biography

Nathanaël Colin-Jaeger, American University of Paris, Center for Critical Democracy Studies, France

Nathanaël Colin-Jaeger holds a PhD in Philosophy from the ENS de Lyon and is currently a postdoctoral researcher in Political Philosophy at the American University of Paris, in the Center for Critical Democracy Studies. His work focuses on the normative justifications for the market order, democratic theories, and liberal and neoliberal theories.

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Published

2024-07-05

How to Cite

Colin-Jaeger, N. (2024). Can We Design Spontaneity? Hayek, Design, and the Normative Appeal of Spontaneous Orders. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 17(1), aa-aa. https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.736