Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics

Hybrid Vigor

2018-11-15T00:46:55-08:00

The ecological approach to rationality involves evaluating choice processes instead of choices themselves, and there are good reasons for doing this. Proponents of the ecological approach insist that objective performance criteria (such as monetary gains) replace axiomatic criteria, but this claim is highly contentious. This paper investigates these issues through a case study: 12 risky choice processes are simulated, and their performance records are compared. The first criterion is conformity to the Expected Utility axioms; the Priority Heuristic stands out for frequently violating Transitivity. Next, the Expected Value criterion is applied. Minimax performs especially poorly—despite never violating an axiom—highlighting the tension between axiomatic (coherence) and objective (correspondence) criteria. Finally, I show that axiom violations carry high costs in terms of expected value. Accordingly, coherence does not guarantee objectively high performance, but incoherence does guarantee diminished performance.

The Evolutionary Explanation of What?

2018-11-15T00:46:55-08:00

The paper examines evolutionary explanations of risk preferences. First, the paper argues that evolutionary psychology is ill-suited for explaining prospect theory risk preferences since the empirical evidence does not support the universality of the fourfold pattern of risk preferences postulated by prospect theory. Second, the paper argues that explaining prospect theory risk preferences by means of risk-sensitive foraging models is incomplete since this approach does not offer a rationale for the observed diversity in human decision making involving monetary gambles. Finally, the paper suggests adopting a wider perspective on evolutionary approaches to human behaviour that also takes into account the role of cultural processes in shaping risk preferences.

Naturalism and Moral Conventionalism

2018-11-15T00:46:55-08:00

This article provides a critical examination of Ken Binmore’s theory of the social contract in light of philosophical discussions about moral naturalism and moral conventionalism. Binmore’s account builds on the popular philosophical device of the original position but gives it a naturalistic twist. I argue that this makes it vulnerable to moral skepticism. I explore a possible answer to the moral skeptic’s challenge, building on the fact that Binmore’s account displays a variant of moral conventionalism. I ultimately conclude however that the conventionalist answer leads to a purely behaviorist view of morality, which implies that there is nothing special about morality and fairness norms. I propose alternative interpretations of conventionalism. These accounts escape most of the difficulties because they place emphasis on the reasons that establish a moral convention.

Philosophy With Feet in the Mud

2018-11-15T00:46:56-08:00

EJPE interviewed Professor Robeyns about her formative years, her scholarship on the capability approach, her ERC-funded Fair Limits project, the relevance of political philosophy for public policy, and her advice for young philosophers aspiring to an academic career.

Review of Anna Alexandrova’s A Philosophy For the Science of Well-Being. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 196 pp.

2018-11-15T00:46:56-08:00

Review of Yahya M. Madra’s Late Neoclassical Economics. The Restoration of Theoretical Humanism in Contemporary Economic Theory. New York: Routledge, 218 pp.

2018-11-15T00:46:56-08:00

Review of Herbert Gintis’s Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017, 357 pp.

2018-11-15T00:46:56-08:00

The Measurement of Wellbeing in Economics

2018-11-15T00:46:56-08:00