Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics

Group Membership or Identity?

2021-10-05T22:23:19+02:00

As part of an article symposium on Partha Dasgupta and Sanjeev Goyal’s “Narrow Identities” (2019, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics), Miriam Teschl reflects on the distinctive concept of identity liberal cosmopolitans have and how it may or may not be captured in economic models of identity choice.

The Paths to Narrow Identities

2021-08-22T11:08:04+02:00

As part of an article symposium on Partha Dasgupta and Sanjeev Goyal’s “Narrow Identities” (2019, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics), Jean-Paul Carvalho reflects on the concept of narrow identity and the ways of modelling its emergence.

Deepening and Widening Social Identity Analysis in Economics

2021-10-05T22:11:33+02:00

As part of an article symposium on Partha Dasgupta and Sanjeev Goyal’s “Narrow Identities” (2019, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics), John B. Davis reflects on the variety of social identities and the implications this variety has for social identity analysis.

Can One Both Contribute to and Benefit from Herd Immunity?

2021-06-25T12:42:20+02:00

In a recent article, “Vaccine Refusal Is Not Free Riding”, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.

Social Contract, Extended Goodness, and Moral Disagreement

2021-05-20T17:21:10+02:00

This article discusses the role played by interpersonal comparisons (of utility or goodness) in matters of justice and equity. The role of such interpersonal comparisons has initially been made explicit in the context of social choice theory through the concept of extended preferences. Social choice theorists have generally claimed that extended preferences should be taken as being uniform across a population. Three related claims are made within this perspective. First, though it is sometimes opposed to social choice theory, the social contract approach may also consider the possibility of interpersonal comparisons. This is due to the fact that justice principles may be partially justified on a teleological basis. Second, searching for the uniformity of interpersonal comparisons is both hopeless and useless. In particular, moral disagreement does not originate in the absence of such uniformity. Third, interpersonal comparisons should be accounted for both in social choice and social contract theories in terms of sympathetic identification based on reciprocal respect and tolerance, where each person’s conception of the good partially takes care of others’ good. From the moral point of view, any person’s conception of the good should thus be ‘extended’ to others’ personal conceptions. This extension is, however, limited due to the inherent limitations in sympathetic identification and is a long way from guaranteeing the uniformity assumed by social choice theorists.

Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity

2021-01-05T17:32:18+01:00

The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In this article, I move beyond traditional first-order moral theorizing and, based on multilevel social contract theory (Moehler 2018, 2020a), develop a practically sound notion of moral agency for morally diverse societies. The interrelational and dynamic notion of integrated moral agency developed in this article demands that agents actively exercise their rational and affective capacities, are receptive to the capacities of others, and are aware of the type of moral interaction in which they engage with others. The notion of integrated moral agency helps agents to reconcile conflicting first-order moral directives and to maximally protect agents’ autonomy in morally diverse societies.

Choosing Less over More Money

2021-03-16T11:14:58+01:00

Why choose less money over more when no one is watching? A central tenet of economics is that this behaviour can be explained by intrinsic motivation. But what does intrinsic motivation entail? What encourages it? This paper answers these questions through a Smithian lens: moral motivation includes not only a naturally strong love of praise and dread of blame but also a natural, and stronger, love of being worthy of praise and dread of being worthy of blame, even if neither is necessarily given. I rely on quantitative and qualitative data from economic experiments to illustrate this claim. While the current scholarship on Smith has applied his theory to situations in which our actions either evoke reactions from others or have monetary consequences for them, I extend his insights to receiver games (Tjøtta 2019) and dice-rolling games (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) aimed at eliciting self-regarding concerns, that is, actions affecting the interests of only ourselves. I argue that these games accentuate the strength of the love of praiseworthiness in guiding behaviour, emphasising its immediate reference to others and foundation in intentions along with outcomes.

Review of Michel S. Zouboulakis’ The Varieties of Economic Rationality: From Adam Smith to Contemporary Behavioural and Evolutionary Economics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014, 192 pp.

2021-10-15T16:32:13+02:00

A Tale Between Finance and Economics

2021-10-30T13:52:25+02:00