https://www.ejpe.org/journal/issue/feedErasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics2024-07-29T00:00:00+02:00Ruth Korteeditors@ejpe.orgOpen Journal Systems<p>The Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics (EJPE) is a peer-reviewed bi-annual academic journal located at <a href="https://www.eur.nl/">Erasmus University Rotterdam</a>. EJPE publishes research on the methodology, history, ethics, and interdisciplinary relations of economics.</p>https://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/849The Challenge of Choosing Well2024-05-27T14:03:45+02:00Chrisoula Andreouc.andreou@utah.eduTessa Supert.e.super@vu.nlAnnalisa Costellaa.costella@vu.nl2024-05-27T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Chrisoula Andreou, Tessa Super, Annalisa Costellahttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/880Review of Thomas Nagel’s Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2023, v + 70 pp.2024-07-22T12:19:17+02:00J. R. de VriesJeroen_devries@outlook.com2024-07-22T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 J. R. de Vrieshttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/871Review of Ingrid Robeyns’ Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth, UK: Allen Lane, 2024, xxv + 303 pp.2024-07-04T17:43:45+02:00Mario Damboreneamario.dambor@gmail.comSieb Brouwersiebbrouwer@gmail.com2024-07-05T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Mario Damborenea, Sieb Brouwerhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/864Review of Michael Otsuka’s How to Pool Risks Across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, viii + 109 pp.2024-06-25T18:03:56+02:00Benjamin FergusonBenjamin.ferguson@warwick.ac.uk2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Benjamin Fergusonhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/878Review of Federica Liveriero’s Relational Liberalism: Democratic Co-Authorship in a Pluralistic World. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023, xvi + 291 pp.2024-07-19T17:18:03+02:00Camilla Barbiericamillabarbieri96@gmail.comMatteo Boccaccimatteo.boccacci@unipv.it2024-07-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Camilla Barbieri, Matteo Boccaccihttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/883Review of Stephen Engelmann’s Economic Rationality: What is Political Economy? Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2022, 144 pages.2024-07-22T20:42:59+02:00Mark McAdammark.mcadam@uni-siegen.deJan Robin Kleinerjan.kleiner@student.uni-siegen.de2024-07-23T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Mark McAdam, Jan Robin Kleinerhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/781Cybersocialism and the Future of the Socialist Calculation Debate2023-10-12T04:10:43+02:00Jan Philipp Dapprichdapprich@uni-potsdam.deDan Greenwoodd.greenwood2@gmail.com<p>In the long running debate about the desirability and feasibility of a planned socialist economy, Austrian economists proclaim victory. Drawing from Mises and Hayek, they stress that the problem of deciding the most economic methods for producing goods and services is not simply, as some early socialist responses suggested, a ‘computational’ one but is rather epistemological. Hence, they reject recent ‘cybersocialist’ claims that developments in computational technology offer potential for addressing the ‘socialist calculation problem’ famously formulated by Mises, long before the advent of computer technology. Yet this theoretical claim by Austrians hinges more than is recognised upon the capacity of rapidly evolving computational technologies and their potential applications. We highlight the need to re-appraise Austrian conclusions, attending closely to the distinction offered by Mises between supply and demand-side calculation. Recent cybersocialist proposals should be viewed as opening up several different avenues of research relating to different aspects of the long-running socialist calculation debate, including the inter-relationships between economic calculation, incentives and innovation.</p>2024-07-06T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Jan Philipp Dapprich, Dan Greenwoodhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/764Intergenerational Cooperation and Justice between Age Groups2024-01-02T09:51:52+01:00Greg Bognargreg.bognar@philosophy.su.se<p>In this paper, I bring together the problems of justice between age groups and intergenerational cooperation in light of real-life demographic trends. I begin by presenting a simple model of intergenerational cooperation based on indirect reciprocity and show how cooperation can break down due to exogenous factors, including demographic change. I use the model to make the argument that principles for justice between age groups must be sensitive to the stability of intergenerational cooperation. I illustrate my thesis by considering the debate between distributive and relational egalitarians on justice between age groups.</p>2024-07-19T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Greg Bognarhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/778Liberalism’s Difficult Relationship with the Welfare State2024-04-03T11:44:22+02:00Harald Borgebundharald.borgebund@hiof.no<p>This paper makes two related points. First, as liberals have started to realize that the welfare state is unable to deliver on egalitarian theories of justice, they have increasingly tried to dissociate their theories from the welfare state. Second, dissociating from the welfare state type of thinking is difficult for some liberal egalitarian theories such as John Rawls's theory of justice as his theory shares some of the same underlying thinking as found in the welfare state. For example, Rawls's understanding of universal citizenship and the difference principle resembles some of the aspects of the welfare state on how social equality and citizenship are tied to productivity and society as a venture of mutual cooperation. Consequently, liberals are caught in a difficult relationship where they can only partially move beyond the welfare state. Because of this affinity liberals should move beyond a Rawlsian framework, as Rawls's theory is difficult to completely dissociate from the welfare state.</p>2024-07-09T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Harald Borgebundhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/736Can We Design Spontaneity? Hayek, Design, and the Normative Appeal of Spontaneous Orders2024-05-27T14:58:39+02:00Nathanaël Colin-Jaegerncolinjaeger@aup.edu<p>Spontaneous orders are an essential concept in political theory and political economy. Such orders entail the impossibility of predicting outcomes in detail and hence controlling and directing social processes. Many phenomena characterizing contemporary societies can be depicted as spontaneous orders, from the housing and financial markets to the evolution of norms and trends. Yet, it is well known that not every spontaneous order is beneficial. Therefore, what form of political framework is compatible with recognizing such orders? In this article, I address this problem through the example of the work of Friedrich Hayek, a prominent liberal theorist of spontaneous orders. His work shows the necessity to theorize a government of spontaneous orders based on maximizing reasonable expectations and individual freedom. I finally emphasize what such a theory implies for political power, which is not abolished but should handle complexity appropriately.</p>2024-07-05T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Nathanaël Colin-Jaegerhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/780The Plurality of Economic Classifications2024-01-21T12:26:13+01:00Cristian Frassercristian.frasser@correounivalle.edu.coGabriel Guzmángfguzmanc@ut.edu.co<p>The standard strategy involves evaluating whether economic classifications meet criteria derived from a general theory of natural kinds. The first objective of this article is to show the implementation of this strategy by various relevant authors. We argue that the standard strategy has failed due to its lack of a greater sensitivity to the role played by human interests in the design of different types of natural kinds. The second objective is to outline a new strategy for investigating economic classifications. Our departure from the standard strategy can be described as a shift from assessing economic classifications based on general theories of natural kinds to examining specific cases with the aim of theorizing about their design and application. The cases of the cost-of-living index and race are used to succinctly discuss the objectivity of economic classifications and implications for the relationship between science and democracy.</p>2024-05-27T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Cristian Frasser, Gabriel Guzmánhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/865Reflections on the 2023 Nobel Memorial Prize Awarded to Claudia Goldin2024-06-25T18:23:52+02:00Nancy Folbrenancy.folbre@gmail.com2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Nancy Folbrehttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/862Between Worlds: Daniel Ellsberg (1931–2023)2024-06-25T16:33:42+02:00Ivan Moscatiivan.moscati@uninsubria.itCarlo Zappiazappia@unisi.it<p>Daniel Ellsberg was a multifaced personality who belonged to multiple worlds: academia, the military, and, in the second part of his life, political activism. This essay reviews Ellsberg’s analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, which has been highly influential in economics and reflects his diverse experiences.</p>2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Ivan Moscati, Carlo Zappiahttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/863Obituary: Robert Solow and Economic Modeling2024-06-25T17:19:49+02:00Roger E. Backhouser.e.backhouse@bham.ac.uk2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Roger E. Backhousehttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/881Editorial Note2024-07-22T14:42:22+02:00Annalisa Costellaa.costella@vu.nlBenjamin Mullinsmullins@esphil.eur.nl<p>Oftentimes many individual acts lead to a significantly (dis-)valuable outcome though the performance of each act makes no valuative difference to that outcome. Such cases give rise to a dilemma. For it seemingly doesn’t matter whether one performs an act (or not) if it doesn’t make a difference. Yet it matters a great deal when many of these acts are performed, provided they bring about a significant outcome. One might think, therefore, that at least <em>some</em> reason favours the performance of such acts. But in the absence of a valuative difference, it is difficult to say what that reason is, exactly.</p> <p>The above dilemma arises in both <em>intra</em>personal and <em>inter</em>personal cases. For instance, in the intrapersonal case, it seemingly makes little difference to my goal of running the marathon whether I skip a single workout. Yet it makes a significant difference to my goal of running the marathon if I skip <em>all </em>of my workouts. And, in the interpersonal case, it seemingly makes no difference to the bad effects of climate change if I choose to be a vegan or not. Yet it makes a significant difference to the bad effects of climate change if we <em>all</em> choose to be vegans. This dilemma has generated a substantial body of literature in both ethics and rational choice. Surprisingly, however, there has been little crossover between the two fields of study. The motivation for the special issue was to offer an avenue to explore new solutions or perspectives on the dilemma through the lens of one, or both of these fields.</p>2024-07-22T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Annalisa Costella, Benjamin Mullinshttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/786Intra/Inter Paradox2024-02-13T20:48:10+01:00Jan Willem Wielandj.j.w.wieland@vu.nl<p>This paper addresses the following paradox. (P1) It is permitted to defect in intrapersonal dilemmas as long as there is a solution to achieve one’s long-term goal. (P2) It is not permitted to defect in interpersonal dilemmas, even when there is a similar solution to achieve a collective goal. (P3) There is no relevant difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal dilemmas. At least one of the three propositions must go. In this paper, I show how (P1) is supported by Chrisoula Andreou’s work, and offer a defense of (P2). This has surprising implications. The aim will not be to solve the paradox, but rather to show there is one that we should attend to in the first place.</p>2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Jan Willem Wielandhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/789Collective Doings in Progress and the Attribution Problem2024-02-26T21:21:24+01:00Tessa Supèrt.e.super@vu.nl<p>We often encounter situations in which an undesirable outcome is brought about through a series or collection of seemingly inconsequential actions. This phenomenon, referred to as the inefficacy paradox, occurs both intrapersonally and collectively. Paradoxically, while we have good reason to avoid such patterns of action, there appears to be no compelling reason to abstain from any of the individual actions constituting such a pattern given its trivial impact. This paper scrutinizes Chrisoula Andreou's prominent endeavor to resolve the inefficacy paradox in both the intrapersonal and the collective context by utilizing their structural similarity. While her approach may prove successful in intrapersonal cases, the applicability of the proposed solution to collective cases is, I argue, ultimately limited. This is due to a fundamental dissimilarity between these two kinds of cases, which I lay out in the paper. This insight may also shed light on the transferability of other proposed solutions to the inefficacy paradox from the intrapersonal to the collective context.</p>2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Tessa Supèrhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/788Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control2024-02-05T21:40:07+01:00Chrisoula Andreouc.andreou@utah.edu<p>According to a familiar and entrenched philosophical paradigm, poor self-control amounts to diminished control by the self. While some cases of poor self-control may fit this paradigm, many paradigmatic cases of poor self-control, including cases involving individually trivial effects, do not; they are better understood as cases in which the self controls behavior, but does so poorly. As such, philosophical research on poor self-control needs to go beyond research aimed at locating and empowering the self, and into research on what it takes for selves that are already in control to qualify as managerial successes rather than managerial failures. This article focuses on certain pitfalls associated with micromanagement and on the paradoxical connection between micromanagement and poor self-control in cases involving individually trivial effects. The article ends by advancing an approach to managerial success that provides a promising route to avoiding micromanagerial pitfalls while also promoting responsible resilient agency.</p>2024-05-27T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Chrisoula Andreouhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/797The Hardness of the Practical Might2023-11-21T15:16:12+01:00Sergio Tenenbaumsergio.tenenbaum@utoronto.ca<p>Incommensurability is often introduced with the small improvement argument. Options A and B are shown to be incommensurable when it is neither the case that A is preferred to (or better than) B nor that B is preferred to (or better than) A, but a slightly improved version of A (A+) is still not preferred to B. Since A+ is preferred to A, but not to B, we must also conclude that it is also true that A and B are not indifferent (or equally good). Such incommensurable options seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory (and various forms of value theory) but options that obey the pattern described by this argument seem ubiquitous: my choice between lemon tarts and eclairs at my favourite pastry shop might exhibit this pattern, but so could my choice between jobs or careers. In trying to accommodate incommensurable options within various frameworks, philosophers have argued that we must preserve certain central features of the phenomenon. Among them is the supposed “hardness” of at least some incommensurable options: even if perhaps one would need to be a rather anxious gourmet to describe the choice between lemon tarts and eclairs as hard, the choice among careers could potentially be agonizing. However, it is not clear in which way choices among incommensurable options are “hard,” nor how and whether such hardness poses problems for the various accounts of incommensurable choices. To complicate matters, the deontic verdicts for choices between incommensurable options seem to be relatively straightforward: one appealing view is that in such circumstances I am rationally permitted to choose any option that is not worse than another option. This paper aims to provide a sharper formulation of at least a version of the hardness problem, to argue that various theories of incommensurability fail to account for the hardness of some incommensurable choices, and to propose that the theory of instrumental rationality I develop in Rational Powers in Action, aided by a Kantian insight, promises to provide an adequate explanation of the hardness of choice among incommensurable options.</p>2024-07-11T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Sergio Tenenbaumhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/798The Problem of Collective Harm: A Threshold Solution2024-01-22T21:28:57+01:00Frank Hindriksf.a.hindriks@rug.nl<p>Many harms are collective: they are due to several individual actions that are as such harmless. At least in some cases, it seems impermissible to contribute to such harms, even if individual agents do not make a difference. The Problem of Collective Harm is the challenge of explaining why. I argue that, if the action is to be permissible, the probability of making a difference to harm must be small enough. This in turn means that both the probability of harm and the probability of avoiding harm have to remain below the corresponding threshold probabilities. I compare this threshold probability account to proposals that revolve around difference-making, NESS causation and security dependence, and I argue that they fail for reasons of scope. For instance, a moral principle that invokes NESS causation prohibits so many actions that compliance with it would have a stifling effect on human life.</p>2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Benjamin Mullins; Frank Hindrikshttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/790Carbon Offsets and Shifting Harms2024-04-01T10:09:22+02:00Luke Elsonluke.elson@reading.ac.uk<div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p>Carbon offsets either remove greenhouse gases from the air or prevent emissions thereof. They face questions both economic (is ‘net zero’ really reached?) and moral. I defend the moral permissibility of off-sets. They likely shift climate harms around, but that need not be unjust—and in any case we cannot avoid doing that.</p> </div> </div> </div>2024-07-05T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Luke Elsonhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/868Managing Temptation: Comments on Chrisoula Andreou’s ‘Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control’2024-06-29T11:52:01+02:00Timothy Luke Williamsontimothy.williamson2@philosophy.ox.ac.uk<p>In ‘Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control’, Chrisoula An-dreou argues that some cases of poor self-control are best understood as arising from poor self-management, in particular a kind of intrapersonal micromanagement. She argues that this furnishes us with a better understanding of those cases than the orthodox foreign force paradigm does (on which poor self-control amounts to diminished self-control). I argue that we cannot do without the foreign force paradigm to explain the cases that Andreou discusses. I suggest a both/and approach on which poor self-management and diminished self-control together explain poor self-control.</p>2024-06-29T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Timothy Luke Williamsonhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/877Self-Control and Planning: A Reply to Williamson2024-07-11T17:44:47+02:00Chrisoula Andreouc.andreou@utah.edu<p>In Timothy Luke Williamson’s commentary on my article “Micromanagement and Poor Self-Control,” Williamson casts my focus on managerial failures in certain cases of poor self-control “as an especially fruitful tool for addressing problems of poor self-control”; but he suggests that the cases of poor self-control that I view as cases of managerial failure <em>also</em> involve control by a foreign force, in accordance with the “foreign force paradigm,” which I claim is off base in the cases on which I focus. Although I cannot get into Williamson’s entire interesting and elaborate argument, I here question <em>The Weak Planning Perspective</em>, which plays a key role in Williamson’s critical response, with the aim of addressing the issues he raises and shedding some light on why and how our views diverge.</p>2024-07-11T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Chrisoula Andreouhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/872What’s so Hard about Hard Choices?2024-07-09T13:34:30+02:00Ruth Changruthechang@gmail.com<p>What, exactly, is so hard about hard choices? I suggest that what is distinctively hard about hard choices is that they present us with the <em>volitional</em> difficulty of putting ourselves behind an alternative and thereby making it true of ourselves that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. Making it true through your commitments that, for instance, you have most reason to be a philosopher rather than a lawyer makes the choice between the careers hard. This answer is in contrast to that of Sergio Tenenbaum, who understands the hardness of a hard choice as a <em>deliberative</em> difficulty in specifying our alternatives and ends in ways that conform with certain proposed constraints of rationality. For Tenenbaum, the hardness of hard choices is not distinctive to such choices but is a general difficulty rational agents face when they need to further specify their alternatives and ends, even if the choice is easy.</p>2024-07-11T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Ruth Changhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/876The Hard Things about Hard Choices? A Reply to Chang2024-07-11T17:07:26+02:00Sergio Tenenbaumsergio.tenenbaum@utoronto.ca2024-07-11T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Sergio Tenenbaumhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/869Securing Obligations: A Reply to Hindriks2024-07-03T14:05:51+02:00Mattias Gunnemyrmattias.gunnemyr@gu.seCaroline Torpe Touborgcaroline.touborg@gmail.com<p>In his contribution to this special issue, Hindriks considers the Security Principle, an account of pro tanto obligations based on our account of reasons (Gunnemyr and Touborg 2023a). According to the Security Principle, you have a pro tanto obligation not to perform an action that makes a harm more secure. Hindriks raises two objections to this account. First, that it is too flexible; second, that it gives wrong verdicts when agents are robustly unwilling to act in a certain way. Here, we respond to Hindriks’ objections and argue that Hindriks’ account, the Threshold Principle, gives counterintuitive verdicts in preemption and low-probability cases.</p>2024-07-05T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Mattias Gunnemyr, Caroline Torpe Touborghttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/870Carbon Offsets and Concerns About Shifting Harms: A Reply to Elson2024-07-04T17:19:41+02:00Kian Mintz-Wookian.mintz-woo@ucc.ie<p>Luke Elson defends carbon offsetting on the basis that it is not morally objectionable to shift harms or risks around. As long as emitting and offsetting does not increase the overall harms or risks—and merely shifts them—compared to refraining from emitting, he suggests there is no injustice involved. I respond in several ways, suggesting that the time delay involved in offsetting can increase these risks but, regardless, there is a defensible default which could justify refraining from emitting, even when planning to offset.</p>2024-07-05T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Kian Mintz-Woohttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/882Carbon Offsets and Concerns about Shifting Harms: A Reply to Mintz-Woo2024-07-22T17:36:24+02:00Luke Elsonluke.elson@reading.ac.uk2024-07-28T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Luke Elsonhttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/812Progressive-Era Racism and Another 'Blaming the Victim' Narrative2024-01-08T08:47:07+01:00Luca Fioritoluca.fiorito.1967@gmail.com<p>This note reproduces a brief article by Thomas Nixon Carver, a leading Progressive Era American economist on what was then called the ‘Negro Question’. This virtually unknown piece represents a striking instance of blaming the victim for her/his condition which is to be found in the economic literature of the period.</p>2024-05-27T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Luca Fioritohttps://www.ejpe.org/journal/article/view/838What is Owed to the Losers of the Energy Transition?2024-04-06T02:18:56+02:00Rutger Lazourutger.lazou@gmail.com2024-05-24T00:00:00+02:00Copyright (c) 2024 Rutger Lazou